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GENDER AND NEGOTIATIONS: WHEN DOES GENDER PLAY A ROLE IN NEGOTIATING?

KAREN HARRINGTON
University of Rhode Island
The fable takes place during the holidays, involving two sisters. One sister is planning to bake a
chiffon cake for Christmas dinner; the other, a fruitcake. Both recipes each call for one orange.
When the sisters check the pantry, they find only one orange, not the two they need. An argument
immediately erupts over who gets the orange. One sister complains that the chiffon cake is wrong
for the season. The other retorts the fruitcake may be traditional but nobody likes it. Obvious
solutions are out of the question. It being a holiday, they cannot borrow from the very neighbors
who will later be their guests, and the stores are closed. The sisters, unwilling to compromise and
bake only half a recipe, become more and more entrenched in defending their rights. After a fair
amount of bickering, the mother cuts the orange in half. A fair solution? The needs of the sisters
remained ambiguous throughout the argument. How would have the solution differed if the sisters
were to explain their needs; while one sister needed orange peel, the other needed orange juice. If
chiffon cake was intended for solely one sister and the fruitcake was to be donated to another
family, would the end result change? Would the sister making the fruitcake, on behalf of others, be
more assertive in negotiating for the orange? Would the situation change if this fable was written
as an argument between a sister and brother? Some say “yes” (Kolb, 2000)

Catalyst, a research and advisory
organization committed to advancing women in
business, tracked the representation of women in
Fortune 500 companies throughout the past
decade. According to the annual census, in 1995
women held 8.7 percent of Fortune 500
corporate officer positions. With an increase of
nearly 7 percent by 2002, the percentage of
female representation had increased to 15.7
percent, but still capped, however, at a very
small percentage as it relates to the nearly 85
percent male representation in the remaining
upper-level corporate workforce (Wellington
2003).
Research suggests obstacles to
advancement may include lack of mentoring,
commitment
to
personal
or
family
responsibilities, limited opportunity for visibility
and disparaging proportions in aggressively
progressive career choices.
Although the
stereotypical “glass ceiling” may indeed also
play a role in impeding advancement, some may
additionally cite a “glass wall”, building lateral
barriers that limit women’s career potential
almost from the beginning of their careers.
Evidence suggests these barriers may not be
necessarily
constructed
by
formulized

regulations or standards, but by women
themselves and predicted patterns of behavior.1
Pradel, Bowles, and McGinn (2005)
describe this scenario. Maureen Park, the
managing director of a small portfolio
management firm, reports to a parent company.
The parent company has been repeatedly
performing below forecasts and morale among
Park’s understaffed, overworked team of
research analysts was low. To make matters
worse, Park’s two best analysts both requested
significant raises after their annual reviews.
Both women expressed their belief that they
were earning substantially less than analysts at
comparable firms and probably less than lowerachieving members of their firm – including
male colleagues who had been lured away from
a competitor.
Park went to bat for her star performers,
though management had instructed her to offer
only cost-of-living raises. To her surprise, her
superiors agreed to offer better incentives to
both analysts. Reflecting on her triumph, Park
1

Not in any way, should this statement be construed
as placement of blame but merely a suggestive notion
that some barriers as they relate to gender are results
of habitual gender socialization repeated by women
and their own perceived roles that narrow
progression.
© Karen Harrington, 2006
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realized with bitter irony that three of her seven
direct reports would make more the she would in
the coming year; she herself had accepted a
small cost-of-living raise without question. If
getting a raise was so easy, why hadn’t she made
a case for herself? Is it possible that her gender
somehow influenced how Park negotiated for
herself and others (Pradel, 2005)?
Babcock and Laschever (2003) describe an
analogous study conducted by Jennifer Halpern
and Judi McLean Parks utilizing undergraduates
in a negotiations class at Carnegie Mellon
University. The class was separated into samesex groups of two and instructed to negotiate
about allocating public money to build a
children’s
playground
(establishing
an
undoubtedly competitive environment). One
member in each group was appointed to play the
role of representative of the Parks Department;
the other the representative of a community
volunteer organization.
Dramatic differences in negotiation behavior
were exhibited between male and female teams.
Males were more likely than females to talk
about their positions (how much they wanted to
see allocated to the project), with all of the male
pairs discussing their positions but only 17
percent of the female pairs doing so. Males also
used confrontational bargaining techniques
(making threats or posing ultimatums) more,
with men using confrontational tactics nine
times as much as women did. (Only two of the
12 female pairs became confrontational at all.)
In comparison, the female pairs talked about
personal information far more than the males (92
percent of the females compared to 23 percent of
the males introduced information about
themselves into the negotiation). The personal
information the women discussed was directly
relevant to what each side wanted, and
introducing this information into their
negotiations helped expand their shared
understanding of the goal on both sides. In
addition, when the women discussed personal
information, they did so within the first five
minutes of the negotiation (negotiating on behalf
of others) but the men who introduced personal
information did so only after 20 minutes of

2

negotiation, and only when they were having
difficulty reaching an agreement.
Another remarkable finding from this study
involved different ways in which the male and
female negotiating teams dealt with the
ambiguity in the case information provided to
them. Whereas 50 percent of the female pairs
discussed how the playground would affect a
senior citizen’s home nearby (falling in line with
the women’s prescribed role as caretakers who
look out for the interests of others), none of the
male pairs took notice of this factor. On the
other hand, 58 percent of the males, but only 8
percent of the females discussed legal liability
issues.
This was particularly noteworthy
because legal issues were not mentioned in the
case materials – the men introduced them on
their own.
The results of Halpern and Park’s
playground study strongly suggest that men
typically focus more on the competitive
elements of a negotiation (discussing their
position from the outset, resorting to
confrontational behavior, talking about each
side’s legal responsibilities) while women focus
more on the relational aspects – the needs of
both sides and how the outcome of the
negotiation will affect other people. While men
focused on the interests at hand, women focused
on the relationship and the vested interest of the
beneficiaries. Maureen initially believed her
negotiation to be successful, gaining a
significant increase for her subordinates, yet
later attaining a realization of personal neglect.
RESEARCH QUESTION
Some researchers and businesspeople may
suggest studies to ask whether men or women
are better negotiators, yet according to the
research of Pradel, Bowles, and McGinn (2005),
gender is not a reliable predictor of negotiation
performance, but certain types of negotiation can
“set the stage” for differences in processes and
outcomes negotiated by men and women
(Pradel, 2005). In the example of Maureen
Parks, Maureen found not only easier to
negotiate on behalf of her employees, but failed
to recognize the opportunity to negotiate a salary
increase for herself. In the playground study,
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the competitive atmosphere and ambiguous
details conveyed in the scenario directed genderstereotypical behaviors; while men negotiated
with a confrontational style aiming for personal
gain, women were more passive, with a
personalized negotiation style and an aim for
mutual gain. Documenting specific cues which
trigger such differences in behavior, this
research review will theoretically answer when
does gender play a role in negotiations?
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differentiations at the bargaining table will also
be examined, reviewing Kolb’s research and
theories and analytical data gathered by Walters’
62 study meta-analysis, comparing bargaining
styles and approaches to collective bargaining.
Concluding, discussion of advancements and
theorized practices for alleviations of gender
differentiations in negotiations will be reviewed
and offered as new insights for further research.
Initiation

RESEARCH APPROACH
The question of if and when gender plays a
role in negotiations will be examined by
reviewing the literature pertaining to negotiation
styles. As a basis of organization, the literature
review will be divided into ten sections with
each section based on an aspect of the
negotiation process. These ten negotiation
variables are initiation, ambiguity, styles,
interests versus relationships, value system
differences, level of competition, beneficiary,
power differences, collective bargaining and
definition of success.
Initiation of the negotiation process or lack
thereof will be first discussed as it differs across
gender. Ambiguity and relating gender
socialization stereotypes will be investigated and
exemplified with both gathered literature and
empirical research. Kolb’s Theory of Shadow
Negotiations assists in the source of ambiguitydriven behaviors, while empirical studies
completed by Kray and Galinsky (2002) and
Babcock and Laschever (2003) place specific
values on constraints, triggers or cues which
provoke gender stereotypical behaviors and
normally have an adverse effect on the
negotiated outcomes. As levels of competition
undulate, levels of stereotypical gender-profiled
characteristics are revealed, reviewed in
Volkema’s (2004) nine-country study.
In
addition, the beneficiary or receiver of the
negotiation outcomes have an impact on the
extent of gender differentiation. Intrinsically
captured, the notion of perceived power will
have a direct effect on the projected amount of
stereotypical gender-related behaviors displayed.
This concept of perceived power will also
include discussion of the Rotter’s Locus of
Control Theory.
The presence of gender

What is negotiable, and when should an
individual attempt to negotiate, rather than
accept, an outcome. While there are a host of
authors claiming, everything is negotiable
(Coehn, 1982; Covic, 2003: Kennedy, 1997),
research tells us there are individual differences
as to topics and situations that a appropriate for
negotiation.
Linda Babcock, a Carnegie Mellon professor
and well-known lecturer within the field of
women studies, conducted a study differences in
starting salaries across genders (Babcock, 2002).
Reviewing first year Carnegie Mellon master
degree students, Babcock looked exclusively at
gender, lending unsettling results. Starting
salaries of the male graduates was on average
6.7 percent or $4000 higher than their female
counterparts.
To discern the difference,
Babcock then reviewed who had negotiated the
starting salary and who had simply accepted the
initial offer. While 57 percent of the male
graduates negotiated beyond the initial offer,
only 7 percent of female students did the same.
Most noteworthy, the students who had
negotiated their starting salaries were able to
increase their initial earnings by 7.4 percent on
average, or $4053 – mirroring the difference
between the male and female starting rate,
suggesting such gender discrepancies could have
been reduced if the women had negotiated.
Accessing when the ability to negotiate is
feasible differs for men and women. Before the
negotiation process even begins, different
perceptions of the opportunity to negotiate
occur. To further delineate, examination of the
cues to initiate the process needed to be
investigated.
Babcock (2002) developed a
theory he calls “Turnip or Oyster.” This theory
based on a spectrum of individual beliefs about
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surrounding opportunities, simplifying the
parameters based on popular clichés. While
some individuals believe “you can’t get blood
from a turnip”, others tend to depict their
surroundings in the view that “the world is your
oyster”. People with the first perspective view
challenges in life as unchangeable and
fundamentally “what you see is what you get”,
while the other end of the spectrum tend to
believe life is bursting with opportunities,
challenging situations can be successful
conquered and there is much to gain through
negotiating for a more desirable outcome. To
testy the theory, Babcock and several colleagues
at Carnegie Mellon University developed a
systematic scale for what they call a “turnip to
oyster” spectrum, which measures the degree to
which an individual recognizes the opportunity
to negotiate. Conducted as a web survey,
participants in a study using this scale were
presented with a series of statements such as:
• I think a person has to ask for what he or she
wants rather than wait for someone to
provide it.
• There are many things available to people, if
only people ask for them.
• Many interactions I have during the day can
be opportunities to improve my situation.
Respondents were instructed to rate along a
seven-point Likert-scale the extent to which they
agreed or disagreed with each of the statements.
Low scorers were individuals who viewed little
benefit to negotiating and interpreted fewer cues
for opportunities to negotiate, while high scorers
were those individuals who perceived most
situations as negotiable and adamantly searched
for opportunities to negotiate. Confirming the
hypothesis of the research group, women were
45 percent more likely than men to score low on
the scale. Further intensifying the difference, 10
percent in the score difference equated to 30
percent more attempts to negotiate (as depicted
in an additional part of the web survey)
(Babcock & Laschever 2003).
Although the survey generated results which
reinforce the gender differences in detecting
situational cues for negotiating, Babcock’s
experiment does suggest gender differences in
confidence levels and a notion of underlying
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sense of pessimism among females. Should this
part of the results be acknowledged as simply a
socially-reinforced behavior from recurring
exposure to gender discrimination or is there any
link between differentiating gender cues and the
confidence placed on the negotiated results?
Deborah Kolb, renowned author and speaker
in fields of women studies and negotiations,
developed a theory of Three A’s (attitudes)
which trigger differentiation during negotiations
(Kolb, 2000). The first “A”, awfulizing, occurs
for many women before a negotiations gets
underway. Without confidence in the capability,
the ability to detect a negotiable opportunity is
clouded. The more evident the weakness, the
more progressively impossible it becomes to
recognize not only the opportunity but
awareness of skills to be utilized to initiate the
negotiation.
When individuals are instructed to conduct a
negotiation and are given explicit instructions
with respect to negotiation, the gender gap is
lessened, however, when the negotiability of the
situation is less pronounced, men and women
rely on their situational cues tell them when an
opportunity for negotiation exists.
Small,
Gelfand, Babcock, and Gettman (2004),
conducted a study to determine how the strength
of cues affected the initiation of negotiation.
The results of the study demonstrate the
consequences of what is referred to as
differential frames or environments with varying
levels of situational triggers. The prediction was
gender differences in negotiation depends on the
situational cues detectable in the environmental.
Research participants (74; 35 males, 39 females)
were instructed to play a word game (pilot
testing showed no gender advantage in exchange
for cash) and were offered the minimum
payment possible. Participants were measured
as to whether they negotiated for a higher
payment from the experimenter, (analogous to
many career advancement opportunities). The
first study centered on whether the participants
would ask for money in a situation where they
were not explicitly told that the payment was
negotiable. Instructed they would receive a
minimum payment of $3 from the experimenter,
the participants in the study were not given any
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information on the how the payment was
determined nor given any performance
feedback. Unknowingly, if the participants
initiated a negotiation, they could receive more
money (up to $10). The participants were given
four rounds of the word game, “Boggle”, played
in a private cubicle. Each round the participant
was instructed to shake the container, let the
cubes drop exposing a letter on each section of
the grid, and was timed as they were to create as
many words as possible from the letters until the
time expired.
Following the completion,
instructions were presented as a reminder to the
participants: you have now completed the four
rounds and will be compensated between $3 $10. Please indicate to the experimenter that
you are finished, so that they can score your
rounds – then you will be paid. Again, if the
participant did not initiate a payment
negotiation, the experimenter paid them $3. If
the participant asked for more, they were paid
$10. Although the results revealed a small
proportion negotiated the payment without any
cues, 23% of the male participants initiated,
while only 3% of females participants initiated
negotiation of the payment.
In a second Small et al. (2004) study, cues
were addressed under three conditions 1)
control, 2) negotiating cue, 3) asking cue.
Hypothesized, cueing to ask will increase the
rates of the initiation of negotiation for a greater
payment among the female participants, thereby
reducing the gender gap. Eighty-one male
participants and 72 female participants
participated in an exchange for cash payment,
once again from $3 to $10. The first condition
was the control which replicated the previous
study. The second condition, participants read a
negotiating cue: You will be compensated
between $3 and $10. The exact payment is not
fixed, and you can negotiate for more if you
want. Many participants negotiate for a higher
payment. In the third condition, participants
read an asking cue: You will be compensated
between $3 and $10. The exact payment is not
fixed, and you can ask for more if you want.
Many participants ask for a higher payment
(Small et al., 2004).
The resulting data reinforced Small’s
hypothesis that gender differences would depend
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on the situational cues. Male participants asked
significantly more frequently than females
within each condition and even more so in the
second condition. The third condition reduced
the gender gap by strengthening the situational
cue, however eliminated ambiguous language.
Whereby “negotiate” leaves room for ambiguity
and suggests a competitive process for most
women, the term “ask” required less confidence
or preparation and a lower expectation for
results. Although the opportunity existed, the
cue for negotiating was given along with a
notion of challenge, uncertain parameters and
ambiguity. As Babcock (1999) stated, “women
often do less well in negotiating environments
not simply because they adopt inferior tactics,
but rather because they do not recognize when
they are (or should be) negotiating and what
they are negotiating about.”
Results of these studies provide support for
the hypothesis that men and women differ as to
when to negotiate and as to what topics or issues
are appropriate for negotiation. It appears that,
in general, men are more likely than women to
view an exchange as an opportunity to negotiate
while women seem more likely to accept an
initial offer in an exchange.
Ambiguity
When individuals understand little about the
limits of the bargaining range and appropriate
standards for agreement, the ambiguity of a
negotiation increases. The more ambiguous the
situation with respect to the appropriateness of
negotiation, the more likely gender triggers
(situation cues that prompt male-female
differences in preferences, expectation, and
behaviors) will influence negotiation outcomes.
Referring back to the previous story of Maureen
Park in the introduction, many ambiguous
factors surrounded the scenario. The outcomes
of Maureen’s negotiation for higher salaries for
her employees leads one to speculate that there
were many inconsistencies in the firm that were
causing a bit of unrest – a clash between skill
level, experience and responsibilities were
coupled with needs for retention allowing for a
an environment to exist where both the
opportunities to negotiate and the content of
what was negotiable was blurred.
While
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Maureen negotiated greater salaries for her
employees to retain her key performers, she
failed to recognize the situational cues for
herself and the need and parameters for
negotiating her own salary and promotion.
When opportunities and limits are unclear, there
becomes an attraction to situational cues which
trigger different behaviors in men and women.
In contrast, low ambiguity may succumb a
greater understanding of the range of negotiated
payoffs and standard resulting values, whereby
the outcomes are less likely to reflect gender
triggers.
Bowles, Riley, Babcock, and McGinn
(2005) explored the concept of ambiguity as it
relates to negotiation and gender differences.
Based upon the psychological theories of
Mischel (1977) and his notion of strong versus
weak situations2 as well as the research of
Snyder and Ickes’ (1985) concept of
precipitation situations, Bowles and her
colleagues adapted these concepts to study
gender in negotiation in terms of “situational
ambiguity” and “gender triggers.”
They
hypothesized that the degree of ambiguity within
a negotiation situation moderates the influence
of individual difference, such as gender, on
negotiation performance. Specifically, the more
ambiguity there is in the negotiation situation,
the more potential there is for the individual
difference to affect performance. Structural
ambiguity refers to the degree of uncertainty in
individual’s understanding of the economic
structure of negotiation (Bowles, et al. 2005).
The less that individuals understand about the
limits of the bargaining range and appropriate
standards for agreement, the more ambiguity
there is in the negotiation situation. Gender
triggers are the situational factors which
“precipitate” gender effects by prompting
gender-related behavioral responses (Bowels, et
al., 2005).
In the first study, the participants were MBA
students who responded to an online job
2

A strong situation is indicated by highly valued
outcomes, strong likelihood of outcome occurring,
and high specificity of requirements associated with a
behavior or set of behaviors.
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placement survey administered by the career
offices of a major American business school.
There were 525 cases (358 men, 176 women).
The log of self-reported base salary offer
accepted acted as the dependent measure, while
lists of industry categories were constructed to
rate structural ambiguity. Structural ambiguity
in this construct was measured by the perceived
expectation of salary discussions with
prospective employers.
As the predicted
expectation narrowed, the level of ambiguity
lessened. The average salary accepted by male
MBAs in the sample was $5,941 higher than the
average salary accepted by female MBAs.
Controlling for pre-MBA work experience, job
market activity, geographic location and job
preferences, the salaries accepted by women
were 5% lower on average than those accepted
by male MBAs. Finally, a significant gender –
structural ambiguity interaction, indicates a 3%
gender difference in low ambiguity industries as
compared to a 10% gender difference in high
ambiguity industries (Bowles, et al. 2005). See
Figure 1 below.
FIGURE 1
Industry Structural Ambiguity
Industry in Descending Order of Ambiguity
High Ambiguity Industries:
31% of sample; M=4.50, Max=5.33, Min = 3.33
Entertainment/media
Retail
Advertising/marketing
Other services (computer, transportation)
Manufacturing
Health/Human services
Financial services
Telecommunications
Low Ambiguity Industries:
69% of sample; M=6.20, Max=6.67, Min = 5.67
High Technology
Venture capital/private equity
Consumer products
Venture capital/private equity
Consumer products
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party attempts to achieve its goals without
concern for the interests of the other party.
Withdrawal or accommodating involves
acquiescence of one party’s goals and interests
to the other party. When the parties act to
suppress the conflict and not deal with it openly,
smoothing or avoidance is being used.
Compromise is used when each party gives up
something in order to get part of what it wants.
Finally, collaboration or problem solving is the
style characterized by an attempt to arrive at a
win-win solution (Thomas, 1992). Furthermore,
individuals are believed to have a dominant style
of conflict resolution which they are more likely
to use across conflict situations.
With respect to the focal question, this
section examines the relationship between
gender and the frequency of use of the various
conflict resolution styles and the factors that
influence these styles.
Assertiveness
Research of gender stereotypical behavior
suggests
that
men
act
aggressively,
independently, and rationally whereas women
act emotionally, passively, and sociallymotivated. Research of negotiation stereotypes
propose women must adopt stereotypically
masculine bargaining style to “succeed” in
negotiating.
Figure 2 below depicts this
argument.

Assertive

Figure 2
Assertiveness and Cooperativeness
Competing

Avoiding
Uncooperative

DIFFERENCES IN STYLES
It is generally recognized that there are five
styles of conflict resolution. A forcing or
competing style is based on the use of one
party’s relative power over the other as one

Collaborating

Compromise

Unassertive

In high structural ambiguity scenarios, the
gender gap in starting salaries approached
$10,000, even after controlling for the wide
array of salary predictors. What Bowles’ study
illustrates is a demonstration that the effect of
gender on MBA salary negotiations is
contingent on the degree of uncertainty about the
potential range and appropriate standards for the
agreement (structural ambiguity).
Deborah Kolb developed a constructed
“self-help” theory for women in negotiations
called the Theory of Shadow Negotiations based
entirely on the premise that during negotiations
women need to discern all of the ambiguous
triggers; how to recognize the unspoken
attitudes, hidden assumptions, and conflicting
agendas that play out in the bargaining process
(Kolb, 2000). In ambiguity, unfortunately, lies a
trend for women to perceive they deserve less
than men. Two Social Psychologists at the State
University of New York at Buffalo, Brenda
Major and Ellen Konar, conducted a mail survey
of students in management programs at the
University.
The survey asked students to
indicate their expected earnings during their
projected career peak (a quite ambiguous
question with uncertain parameters and varying
expectations). In the study, they ruled out
several potential explanations such as gender
differences in pay importance or importance of
doing interesting work, gender differences in
perception of skills and gender difference in
supervisors’ assessments. It was found that men
expected to earn about 13 percent more than the
women during their first year of working fulltime and expected to earn 32 percent more at
their career peaks. (Babcock & Laschever 2003).
Disturbing as they may be, the results indicate a
much greater scope of divergence.
The
more ambiguous the negotiating environment
and parameters, the greater the likelihood gender
will play a role in negotiating, further
segregating the two sexes in their negotiating
style and behaviors.

Accommodating
Cooperative

Source: Thomas, 1991

Regardless of whether an individual
supports this point of view, simple awareness of
the connection can exert an influence on
bargaining behavior. Bem’s Gender Schema
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theory in 1981 laid the groundwork for much
this concept. Bem suggested people interpret
the world through the lens of stable schemas
developed at an early age that speak to what it
means to be a man versus a woman. A basic
assumption of this perspective is that selfconstruals dictate people’s understandings of
appropriate behavior, such that women see
themselves in relation to others whereas men see
themselves as independent from others (Kray &
Thompson, 2004). Applying this assumption to
negotiations, the research suggests women tend
to view negotiations as including the
relationship component. Likewise, to the extent
women perceive negotiations as a masculine
task; they are likely to have lower selfconfidence in the realm than men.
Interests versus Relationships
Another way to view the choice of styles is
to examine the effects of the various styles on
building
and
maintaining
interpersonal
relationships. This relationship can be seen in
figure 3.
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women and men which is quite relevant to the
self-construal theoretical perspective. Tannen
argues men seek independence through their
conversational interactions whereas women
week intimacy and consensus, paralleling the
self-construal concepts (Tannen, 1999).
To
attain such conversational goals, men may take
on a more aggressive, self-gain approach while
women will attempt to establish closeness and
confidence in order to build a partnership with
whomever they are speaking. As it relates to
negotiations, men will tend to take on a
confrontational style during the negotiation
process while women will focus on the
relationship at hand and mutual outcomes.
In writing about women and negotiation,
Miller and Miller (2002) point out that men tend
to use more aggressive styles of negotiation,
while women tend to favor more relational
styles. The specific behaviors associated with
these styles are found in figure 4.
Figure 4
Gender-Stereotyped Negotiating Styles

High

Competing

Collaborating

•
•
•
•

Compromise

•
•
•

Low

Importance of task, goals & interests

COMPETITIVE NEGOTIATING STYLE (Stereotypically Male)

Figure 3
Task vs. Relationship Importance

Avoiding
Low

Accommodating

•

High

You want to get down to the business at hand as quickly as
possible.
Small talk is kept to a minimum except where it facilitates
the negotiation.
Before you begin to negotiate you want to find out about
your counterpart’s status and make them aware of yours.
You give weight to what people say because of the position
they hold.
A discussion is not considered successful unless you have
made progress toward reaching a favorable agreement.
Satisfying the other parties’ interests is significant only to
the extent that furthers your own interests.
You want to reach an agreement as quickly and as
efficiently as possible.
The outcome of this negotiation takes priority, although you
take into consideration the impact your actions might have
on future dealings.

Importance of maintaining relationship
RELATIONAL NEGOTIATING STYLE (Stereotypically Female)

Substantive, or issue based conflict, often
leads to some level of emotive, or emotional,
conflict. Individuals placing high importance on
the maintenance of a relatinship work to avoid
increasing the level of emotive conflict an thus
tend to avoidance, accomodation and, to some
extent, collaboration.
Deborah Tannen in the 1990’s discussed the
differences in conversational styles between

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

You want to get to know the other person first, before you
begin to negotiate.
You would consider it rude not to talk about family and
personal matters before getting down to business.
You do not feel comfortable talking about your status and
achievements because you do not want to appear to be
boastful.
The positions people occupy means less than the positions
they take when negotiating and your relationship with them.
You consider time spent establishing a better relationship to
be time well spent.
You want the other parties to feel good when the
negotiations are concluded.
You are willing to take the time necessary to satisfy
everyone’s needs.
Considerations of the long-term relationship are as
important as the outcome of any single negotiation.
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Value System Differences
Another aspect of this theoretical
perspective proposes gender differences in moral
reasoning. Suggesting that men and women
differ in their value systems, Gilligan disputed
that women are distinct from men in their
preferences for resolving moral conflicts:
justice-based versus care-based. Research by
Gilligan supports that women are more likely to
express an ethic of care whereas men exhibit a
greater tendency to understand moral dilemmas
from a justice perspective (Kray & Thompsen
2004). In recalling the earlier research from
Jennifer Halpern and Judi McLean Parks, 58
percent of the males in the study created legal
support for the argument as playground
department representative, while women were
50 percent more likely to take on the role of
care-giver and argue for the effects on the senior
citizen home.
In Kray and Thompson’s research,
contextual cues or triggers in the environment
determine whether individual variables like
gender emerge to account for variation in
behavior. The underlying belief in this theory is
that variables are expected to be more
pronounced in weak situations, which allow for
more personal interpretations, than strong
situations, which have clear guidelines for
appropriate behaviors. Recalling from previous
ambiguity discussion, when individuals are
instructed to conduct a negotiation and are
possibly given explicit instructions and details,
the gender gap is lessened.
Roger Volkema, Professor at American
University in Washington D.C., further expands
on the notions of Kray and Thompsen, in his
depiction of Bem’s Gender Socialization
Theory.
According to theory, “boys are
socialized at a young age to respect rules, justice
and individual rights, while girls are taught to
consider issues in terms of relationships,
compassion and inclusion.
Oriented more
towards self than others, males are generally
inclined to pursue competitive success at the
expense of interpersonal relationships, believing
that a successful outcome (end) will justify the
means” (Volkema, 2004).
In comparison, according to Psychologist
Patricia Farrell, women are socially reinforced
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with the notion of a certain etiquette that is
required in order to maintain relationships.
More importantly, this relationship etiquette is
carried over to negotiations (Miller and Miller,
2002). Indirect and socially-motivated in their
negotiating style, women tend to “work out”
solutions while maintaining the relationship
rather than drive for the greater gain. Varying
styles are characterized in figure 4 above.
The different negotiating styles of men and
women have a propensity to be displayed in a
corresponding manner with the communication
styles, as expressed earlier through the
conversational studies of Deborah Tannen.
Evidence would suggest gender displays itself
during the negotiating process in preferred styles
and sources of motivation or direction.
Level of Competition
Competitive negotiations can act as triggers,
analogous with societal expectations that men
are more likely than women to be competitive
and to “succeed” in competitive environments.
The question of whether men and women differ
in their degree of competitiveness was addressed
in the research of Walters, Stulhmacher and
Meyer in 1998 in a meta-analysis of 62
experiments.
Consistent with what gender
research suggests men were more competitive
than women, as measured by their offers and
verbal exchanges. Kray and Thompsen reiterated
this earlier evaluation. In 1996, Martell, Lane
and Emrich demonstrated in a computer
simulation that gender differences that explain
only 1% of variance in performance evaluations
led to large differences in the rate of career
advancement for men and women climbing a
hypothetical corporate ladder.
Comparable
results in the areas of competition and for
example,
starting
salaries,
can
leave
compounding effects years later (Kray &
Thompsen 2004).
In 2002, Professor Roger Volkema
conducted extensive research, a nine-country
analysis, of how demographics, culture and
economic predictors affect negotiation behavior
(as they relate to perceived ethicality). Volkema
centered much his research on Hofstede’s four
primary dimensions of national culture: power
distance, individualism-collectivism, uncertainty
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avoidance, and masculinity-femininity (later a
fifth was added, long-term orientation).
Masculine
cultures
value
assertiveness,
competition, justice and performance, whereas
feminine cultures – the opposite – are oriented
more towards nurturance, compassion, and
quality of life (Volkema 2002).
Volkema hypothesized male respondents in
his study would find competitive and
questionable negotiating behaviors to be more
appropriate and would indicate a greater
likelihood of using those behaviors than would
female respondents. In addition, masculinity
would be directly related to the perceived
appropriateness and the likelihood of using
competitive and questionable negotiation
behaviors. The participants in the study were
652 individuals attending graduate business and
managerial/executive training programs in their
home countries and 74 percent of the group were
males. Each of Hofstede’s four dimensions was
examined independently and the data was
collected over a 4-year period. Respondents
were asked to complete the “Incidents in
Negotiation
Questionnaire”
which
was
developed by Lewicki et al in 1997. The
questionnaire focused on 18 competitive or
questionable negotiation behaviors.
These
behaviors represent a continuum of tactics (from
generally accepted behaviors to unaccepted
tactics) which have been found to factor into
five
categories;
traditional
competitive
bargaining, misrepresentation of information,
bluffing, influencing an opponent’s professional
network,
and
inappropriate
information
collection (Volkema, 2002). For each of the 18
behaviors, respondents indicated on a sevenpoint Likert scale the appropriateness of the
behavior and their likelihood of using the
behavior.
The results of factor analysis generally
coincided with the theories of Lewicki and
hypotheses of Volkema. In terms of predictors
of perceived appropriateness, gender was
statistically significant for all five categories of
negotiation behavior, (while age was significant
for bluffing and information collection). For
gender, males found the behaviors to be more
appropriate than did female respondents in each
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case, consistent with original hypothesis. In
addition, masculinity was directly related to
information collection (extent of preparation).
Beneficiary
Earlier review referenced Deborah Kolb’s
Three A theory of gender in negotiations. The
second “A” refers to accommodation; “trapped
in a desire to satisfy everyone, research suggests
women tend to forget about being fair to
themselves” (Kolb 2000).
Labeled as
“nurturers” and “peacekeepers”, women are
typecast into the caregiver role fixated with an
“intuitive aptitude for collaboration”. Similarly,
as previously discussed, women in the Halpern
and Parks study, adapted the caregiver role
without any explicit cues.
Evidence would suggest women tend to
negotiate with greater tenacity when the
negotiation will benefit others for mutual gain
rather than personal gain. Just as with Maureen
Parks in the introduction, there is a tendency to
adjust the negotiation in response to the other
person’s needs, and a failure to reckon the end
cost of the concessions. In another Babcock
study, a large group of executives were asked to
negotiate compensation for an internal candidate
for a new management position. Half negotiated
as the candidate; the other half as the candidate’s
mentor.
The negotiators were given no
reference points or standards for the agreement,
creating a highly ambiguous scenario. Female
executives negotiating as the mentor secured
compensation that as 18 percent higher than the
compensation female executives negotiated
when they were playing the candidate. (The
male executives negotiated on a consistent basis
across roles) (Pradel et al., 2006).
Representation role (negotiating for oneself
or someone else) is a potential gender trigger in
negotiation, according to Bowles, Babcock and
McGinn. Three areas of psychological theory
were discussed in relation. Entitlement suggests
women (as compared to men) have a tendency to
take on a relative lack of deservedness that they
do not extend to others. If this sense of
entitlement occurs and the woman is negotiating
on behalf of others, that advocacy may lead
them to have higher negotiation expectations.
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Another area of psychological research which
supports the advocate/agent theory in
negotiating is that women (as compared to men)
are “more constrained by gender roles and
stereotypes from advocating freely” (Bowles,
2005). Bowles sites the research of Rudman and
Glick whose findings in 1999 indicated women
(as compared to men) who self-promote run a
greater risk of social backlash. Finally, a third
explanation of the representation (advocacy) role
is an adoption of the research of Cross and
Madson in 1997 who theorized that women tend
to develop more interpersonally interdependent
self-construals than do men.
For these
individuals
who
identify
themselves
interdependently,
the
motivation
during
negotiations and the motivation in social
behavior is the obligation to others and a need to
respond to social needs. “The core implication
of Cross and Madson’s studies for gender and
negotiation is that women may be especially
motivated in negotiations in which they are
responsible for representing the interests of
another person s compared to situations in which
they are representing only their own selfinterest. As illustrated, the one trigger that
favors women over men is playing the role of
the advocate or agent as opposed to playing the
role of principal or self-promoter” (Bowles
2005).
Power Differences
Power, the ability to control resources,
evident during the negotiation process is rarely
distributed evenly. It is hypothesized that if
there were to be equal power and equal
perceived power, the outcome would hold a
greater likelihood of also being equal, following
a more integrative approach3. . The extent of
power or perceived power has a tendency to be
directly related to the extent that gender typical
behaviors will be exhibited during negotiations.
The greater the power an individual brings to the
table, the more likely the other individual will
recognize the cue to revert to gender-typical
behavior. The greater an individual perceives
3

Perceived power is referred to as the extent to which
individuals are perceived to have power in directing
results during negotiations, which trigger a difference
in behavior
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the other to have such power; again, the more
likely that individual is to respond with gendertypical behavior.
Related to power is status, which refers to
the legitimate authority, vested in certain
organizational or societal roles (Kray and
Thompsen, 2004). Status impacts what behavior
is expected from a given individual, an influence
on the relationship and negotiation outcomes. In
a field study, conducted by Kanter in the late
1970s, examiners reviewed the sociological
processes of women in a large industrial
corporation. Women’s status affected the level
of attention bequeathed on them and how they
were perceived by others.
Findings also
indicated a numerical minority of women
rendered them disproportionately visible in the
corporation, perceptions of differences between
women and men were polarized and
exaggerated, and perceptions of women were
distorted to fit the gender stereotype about their
social group (Kray and Thompsen 2004). One
could assertively hypothesize the relationship
between status and gender stereotype activation
in Kanter’s study indicates a strong cue for
gender-typical negotiation behaviors.
Based on the research of Julian Rotter, the
Social Learning Theory and Locus of Control
Theory are important backdrops in the power
concept. The main idea in Julian Rotter's Social
Learning Theory is that personality represents an
interaction of the individual with his or her
environment. Rotter has four main components
to his social learning theory model predicting
behavior: behavior potential, expectancy,
reinforcement value, and the psychological
situation. Behavior potential is the likelihood of
engaging in a particular behavior in a specific
situation.
Expectancy is the subjective
probability that a given behavior will lead to a
particular outcome, or reinforcer; expectancies
are formed based on past experience. The more
often a behavior has led to reinforcement in the
past, the stronger the individual’s expectancy
that the behavior will achieve that outcome now.
Reinforcement is another name for the outcomes
of our behavior. Reinforcement value refers to
the desirability of these outcomes. Things we
want to happen, that we are attracted to, have a
high reinforcement value. Things we don't want
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to happen, that we wish to avoid, have a low
reinforcement
value.
Although
the
psychological situation does not figure directly
into Rotter's formula for predicting behavior,
Rotter believed it’s always important to keep in
mind that different individuals interpret the same
situation differently.
Locus of control refers to individuals’
general, cross-situational beliefs about what
determines whether or not they get reinforced in
life. Individuals can be classified along a
continuum from very internal to very external.
Individuals with a strong internal locus of
control believe that the responsibility for
whether or not they get reinforced ultimately lies
with them; these are what Babcock would refer
to as the “oyster” individuals. Internalists
believe that success or failure is due to their own
efforts. In contrast, externalists believe that the
reinforcers in life are controlled by luck, chance,
or powerful others; what Babcock would refer to
as the “turnip” individuals. External locus of
control individuals see little impact of their own
efforts on the amount of reinforcement they
receive.
In terms of negotiations, researchers have
measured the extent to which individuals believe
that
their
behavior
influences
their
circumstances.
Evidence has shown that
individuals with an internal locus of control
spontaneously undertake activities to advance
their own interests more than individuals with an
external locus of control. Internal individuals
are more likely to seek out additional
information in terms of goal attainment, are
more likely to be assertive and are less
vulnerable to negative feedback. According to
Linda Babcock, the average scores for women
are significantly higher on the locus of control
scale than men; indicating a greater likelihood to
divert causation to external forces, rather
personal influence (Babcock 2003).
Power during negotiations refers to level of
influence and ability to control resources.
Perceived power is the level of influence an
individual is believed to possess during the
process. Status is what one brings to the table
which equates a certain level of perceived
power. Research reveals a direct relationship
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between power and the extent gender exhibits
differentiating behaviors; the more power
perceived at the table, the greater the likelihood
gender typical behavior patterns will be cued.
How much power one has at the table may also
be correlated in negotiations with the availability
of alternatives or BATNA, as it relates to
collective bargaining.
Collective Bargaining
In a study conducted by Kray, Reb,
Galinsky, and Thompson, negotiators in the
study who had a strong alternative to the current
negotiation (BATNA4) were predicted to have
larger payout than the negotiators with a weak
alternative. The effect of power, measured by
the strength of the BATNA, was analyzed along
with gender stereotypes which were explicitly
activated in relation to higher levels of power.
In other words, the prediction tested was the
level of the BATNA would be directly related to
the level of power, which would be displayed
during the negotiations through gender-typical
behaviors. Two examinations were tested; one,
how the relative strength of each negotiator’s
best alternative to the current negotiation, or
BATNA, affects the division of resources, and
two, how the manner in which gender
stereotypes are activated in the mind of the
negotiators affects bargaining agreements (Kray,
et al 2002). One factor the researchers pointed
out to consider in a study concerning the
relationship between power and gender during
negotiations is “whether societal expectations
regarding power differ according to gender”
(Kray, et al 2002).
The design of the experiment was a 2x2
factorial with gender stereotype activation and
negotiator power as between-dyad factors. The
participant sample was comprised of 50
undergraduate students in a business school at a
large southwestern university (and informed
they had a chance to win a monetary prize based
on negotiation performance). In the first group
participants were told that effective negotiators
4

BATNA is the Best Alternative to a Negotiated
Agreement or a worst acceptable outcome (Fisher &
Ury, 1981)
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displayed a listing of traits, all of which were
stereotypically masculine, but in another group
participants were told that traits associated with
effective negotiators tend to vary across gender,
whereas no association was made between
effective negotiator traits and gender.
Negotiator power was manipulated on the basis
of the negotiator’s best alternative to the
negotiated agreement (BATNA). Instructions
given to each participant indicated that the goal
of each negotiator was to earn as many points as
possible in the negotiation. Each participant was
given private role information that indicated
their preferences in negotiation. After reviewing
the role instructions, negotiators completed a
pre-negotiation questionnaire that included the
measure of the negotiator’s goal and reservation
price. On a five-point scale, participants also
indicated their perceived power and perceived
diagnosticity of the negotiation.
Upon
completion, participants began negotiating,
videotaped.
The negotiation was centered on what the
researchers call, the New Recruit simulation, or
negotiation between a job candidate and a
recruiter. Eight issues were addressed and given
points with a possible 8,400 to 13,200 points
available. While gender-stereotype activation
was manipulated through the letter of the
“effective negotiator”, power was manipulated
through the implementation of an urgent
message. High power negotiator received a
message stating another party was willing to
settle on a contract worth 4,500 points
(described as quite favorable), while the lower
negotiator was told that another party was
willing to settle on a contract worth 2,200 points
(described as not favorable). Both negotiators
were informed that the average agreement was
worth 3,000.
Consistent with the original hypothesis, high
power negotiators regarded their BATNA as
more attractive than low power negotiators.
High power negotiators believed they derived
more power from their BATNA and perceived a
greater advantage through their role. Having an
attractive alternative to the current negotiation
exerted a clear influence on one’s ability to
demand resources in the current negotiation.
The activation of stereotypes impacted the
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division of resources in integrative negotiations,
but did not influence the creation of resources.
The effect of stereotype activation depended on
the relative strength of the BATNA; explicitly
activating stereotypes about gender differences
led to a greater use of power in the negotiation.
This result suggests if the power position of the
stereotyped individual is weak, an explicit
confrontation with the stereotype results in
performance that is even worse than under
implicit activation of the stereotype.
Keeping in my mind figure two, many
women equate negotiation with confrontation.
Associating the process with a battle, not only
does that connotation act as a deterrent to the
negotiating process, but allows for a viewpoint
that the conflict inherent in negotiating also
jeopardizes the relationship at hand. In most
negotiations, substantive and relationship issues
are largely independent. This notion relates to
collective bargaining in the gender differences in
bargaining style preferences.
Applying earlier moral perspectives to
negotiations suggests that men and women differ
in how they resolve disputes, while also possibly
playing a role in the determination of fairness in
the division of resources. If men place a higher
premium on justice-based morality than do
women, then it lends itself to a preference of
rights-based arguments. In contrast, women’s
tendency to view morality through a care-based
perspective, the might prefer a collaborative
interest-based
approach
to
negotiating.
Theoretically, however, the more “traditional”
the approach, the greater the likelihood gender
triggered behaviors will manifest themselves
(Kray & Thompsen, 2004).
To address the question of whether gender
truly impacts bargaining style, refer back to the
Walters, et al meta-analysis.
During the
extensive study, Walters and researchers
examined negotiation patterns and trends of
mixed-gender interaction. In one study utilizing
an abstract prisoner’s dilemma type-games
(PDGs) and face-to-face behavioral negotiation
tasks, (in a cooperative environment) men acted
in a manner that would suggest a concern with
the relationship by asking questions, engaging in
more self-disclosures and the using the “we”
pronoun more frequently. On the other hand, in
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a more competitive environment, most findings
suggested that women demonstrated greater
concern for the relationship than men. For
example, according to Kray, men used more
self-helpful information and mentioned money
earlier suggesting a lack of concern for the
relationship.
“Whereas men centered their
discussion around positions, women discussed
more personal information than men did” (Kray
and Thompsen, 2004). Overall, women reported
a greater belief that the cooperative choice
(analogous to Interest-Based Bargaining) was a
better one for maximizing their own score than
men did.
Successful Results
Gender plays a role in negotiating also in the
perception of the successful outcomes; while
men may tend to perceive success as the level of
personal gain, women may perceive it as conflict
avoidance, working towards mutually beneficial
results. Recall the story of the orange –
preoccupied with the individual needs, possibly
negotiating on behalf of the beneficiaries of the
holiday desserts, each overlooked the actual
ingredients, the problem, in order to incorporate
a mutually-beneficial solution. While one sister
grates the orange, the other sister can then use it
for squeezing the juice out. Focusing on the
problem without acknowledging the personal
interests and needs can push the results further
into a win-lose conflict. Exemplified repeatedly,
women tend to favor an avoidance of
confrontation. The final “A” of Deborah Kolb’s
Three A theory is avoidance; when negotiation
equates with confrontation, distaste leads to
avoidance (Kolb, 2000). In the care-taker role
or an advocate for another individual,
negotiating with higher expectations is palatable.
When the situation is reversed towards personal
gains, however, many women adapt an
avoidance approach rather than engaging in a
situation which could be deemed combative or
confrontational. In essence, success could be
considered as reaching one’s BATNA while
avoiding confrontation and maintaining the
current relationship.
“Economic payoff is
generally considered the most important
measure of success in negotiation. But when
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talks take place between people with ongoing
social or professional ties, implementation of the
agreement becomes another critical factor. After
all, a single deal is of limited value; but strong,
stable relationships provide rewards across years
of negotiations” (McGinn, 2004).
Hannah Riley, a doctoral candidate at
Harvard Business School, was recently quoted in
Harvard’s online journal, Working Knowledge:
“In a recent survey, where there was potential to
expand the pie, what we found was that men
were better at claiming the pie. On the other
hand, woman-woman dyads were the best at
expanding the pie” (Lagace, 2000). Men were
not better negotiators; the women had a different
set of expectations.
CONCLUSION: NEW MILLENNIUM
The findings become increasingly important
when the differences are potentially damaging to
the opposite sex. According to the research of
Linda Babcock, men are 8 times more likely to
negotiate starting salaries following college
graduation. A career progression started at
different salary points will act as a foundation
for what some call the “escalator principle” or
continued differentiation at a proportional rate, if
the behavioral patterns persist. In the Bowles
study of structural ambiguity across industries,
assuming that the MBAs graduate at the age of
30 and work until they retire at 65, assuming
they receive 3% raises every year – the value of
the gender gap which began at a $10,000 starting
salary difference in earnings will project to a
$600,000 gap over the course of their careers
(Bowles, et al., 2005). Reflecting back to
Maureen Parks – had she been aware of the
equivalent or even greater importance in
negotiating for herself as she deemed important
for her employees, she would not had suffered a
financial and professional disconnect. Had the
female graduates in the Carnegie Mellon study
detected an opportunity to negotiate the starting
salaries with prospective employers, the wage
gap would have lessened.
Erasing the
ambiguous parameters in the salary negotiation
further deteriorates the difference. Offering
equal fortitude in negotiating for oneself as for
another suggest an advantage. The cues, rather
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than acting as triggers for differentiating
behaviors, need to be redirected into tools of
awareness and sources for behavioral change.
Becoming more aware of the situational triggers
which cue an initiation of the negotiation
process is a monumental step in a positive
direction.
Gender does not always play a role in
negotiating. People differ in their personalities,
in their interests, in every aspect which defines
an individual. Decades of research suggests
men and women diverge in what is described as
gender-typical behaviors; patterns of behavior
which are more prevalent with one gender. The
negotiating process tends to set the stage for a
pronounced interaction which may exemplify
these gender-typical behaviors.
Not all
individuals display the magnitude of behaviors
discussed, nor are most individuals extremists in
gender-typical behaviors, however trends depict
a majority demonstrate varying patterns
associated with males and females. Presented
research and evidence illustrate how gender
plays a role in negotiating in the initiation of the
process, the context of the situation, the
prevalence of cues which generate behavioral
patterns, and the perception of success.
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